These past two weeks have been another tough period for survivors and the bereaved families of the Grenfell Tower disaster.
On Friday, 7th Feb, the UK Government confirmed a decision had been taken to replace the remains of the 24-floor apartment block, once home to hundreds of residents, with a memorial to the 72 who so tragically lost their lives there in the early hours of 14th June 2017.
The announcement was, understandably, met with deeply felt and mixed emotions. Grenfell United criticised the process for a lack of “meaningful consultations” ahead of reaching this weighty decision, some people questioned the timing, with other Grenfell survivors expressing acceptance of it.
There are two, universally agreed-upon issues that we focus on here in this article. The first is never to forget the tragedy and those affected, closely followed by the need for a complete system-wide, top-to-bottom change to stop this ever happening again.
Grenfell disproportionally affected the most vulnerable, such as children, and those unable to self-evacuate due to a disability.
Here is something to remember in every decision we make in our duty of care for others:
“…almost half of those people who died in the Grenfell Tower fire were disabled people or children. 41% of disabled people who lived in the Tower died that night. A quarter of all the children who lived in the Tower died that night.” Said Fazilet Hadi, UK Head of Policy at Disability Rights UK, as she called for Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans (PEEPS) to be made mandatory for building owners and management agents.
Some of the elderly residents of Grenfell Tower had lived there for years, while for those like Fathia Ahmed Elsanousi and her family, it was supposed to be a place of safety after fleeing danger to their lives in other countries.
The construction industry, and fire and security safety professionals need to work to the highest technical standards, ever mindful of the end purpose of their profession – so that people can live safely, and sleep at night without fear.
Let’s consider some of the major changes that have occurred since 14th June 2017, regulatory, and if possible, culturally. Culture may be difficult to measure, but it featured heavily in the Hackett report, and its results are tangible.
In response to the tragedy the government launched an urgent Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety, headed by Dame Judith Hackett and a wider-reaching Public Inquiry, chaired by Sir Martin Moore-Bick The purpose of this Review was to make recommendations on fixing the flaws that had developed in regulatory and commercial circles, and identifying changes that were needed as a priority. Part of its scope was to enable an effective regime in future, and to ensure “residents feel that the buildings they live in are safe and remain so”[i]
This ‘Hackett Report’ focused primarily on fire safety issues in high-rise residential buildings, including the regulations, culture, compliance and enforcement in the building industry, fire-safety product systems, building design, construction and ongoing property management. Hackett’s interim report, published that December identified the need for a “universal shift in culture”.
Hackett said it was “crystal clear….from the outset that legislation alone will not deliver the outcomes we are looking for.”
In the final Hackett report, published 17th May 2018, a new regulatory framework was called for, with principles for such regulation described. Many of these principles were taken from successful and well-proven Workplace Health & Safety frameworks, in an area Dame Hackett is well experienced in.
Legislative changes since the Grenfell Tower fire include two new Acts of Parliament (the Primary legislation) and Secondary legislation, examples are:
The Fire Safety Act (2021)
- Amendments to the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (“the FSO”)
- Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022
This new suite of legislation builds on the concepts of “Responsible Person” and “Duty Holder” established in the FSO. It also “clarifies” that the external walls and individual flat entrance doors do fall with scope of the (FSO) 2005, are therefore the RP is responsible for their inspection and upkeep.
The Building Safety Act (2022)
- Amendments to the Building Regulations 2010
- The Building (Higher-Risk Buildings Procedures) (England) Regulations 2023
Introduced the legal requirement for an Accountable Person (AP) and Principal Accountable Person (PAP) for higher-risk buildings.
Construction Products (Amendment) Regulations 2022
These new regulations set the scene for much-needed improvements in areas such as:
Accountability
Regulator and Enforcement powers
Information and communication
Competence
Culture and attitudes
In large-scale and complex construction projects, many people, systems and products affect the eventual outcome. Historically, the emphasis when appointing contractors was on speed and low cost (or what seemed like a cost-saving at the time). This, coupled with the wafer-thin operating margins, tended towards a reduction in quality, safety, and competence. “Adversarial contracting”, as Dame Hackett described it, meant much effort went into avoidance of accountability and made it difficult for those who sought to do the right thing.
The Building Safety Act makes it possible to legally identify the Accountable Person or Persons (AP/s) and Principal accountable person (PAP). The AP and PAP could be the same person or legal entity (such as an association or management company). Although they can employ contractors to undertake duties, they cannot delegate their legal obligations. Each building will have a single PAP although there can be multiple APs - where there is uncertainty who these are, the First Tier tribunal can make a ruling.
An AP is responsible for managing all structural and fire safety risks associated with the residential parts of the building, including inspections, repairs and maintenance to fire doors, door closers, fire alarm and fire fighting systems, etc. To carry out their duties, they can enter private residential units (or appoint a competent person on their behalf) after giving written notice and explaining the purpose of the visit.
An independent regulatory body has been formed within the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), named the Building Safety Regulator (BSR). This serves to guide, inspect and enforce compliance with the Building Safety Act, mirroring the way that the Health and Safety at Work Act is enforced.
Since Oct 2023 developers are required to obtain approval from the BSR before commencing new build higher-risk buildings or make changes to existing ones.
As Dame Hackitt pointed out, H&S legislation is outcomes-based, rather than following prescriptive rules or over-relying on guidance which can lead to some trying to “game the system”. In other words, it is the Accountable Person’s and Responsible Person’s responsibility to identify and mitigate risks within their sphere, not the regulator’s job to publish detailed do’s and don’ts. Instead of asking “where in the regs does it say we have to do xyz?” we need to be asking ourselves “What risks might I have missed? What more can I do to reduce the chance of occurrence and its potential severity?”
The Approved Documents, that support the aims of the Building Act, will continue to be updated in time - in a similar fashion to the HSE helpful guidance booklets. However, it is expected that the building industry will lead with best practices, being familiar with their own trade and products. The current Approved Doc B (fire safety) has been updated with the 2022 – 2029 amendments and is due to be published on 2nd March 2025.
The Home Office is currently working on a revision of “Fire Safety in purpose-built block of flats” (originally produced in 2011), which it intends to publish sometime in 2025. However, the prime responsibility for achieving safety in the built environment rests on those commissioning work and those who undertake it.
Two findings from Dame Hackett’s report were a breakdown of communication between Grenfell Tower’s property management and residents, and that the Fire and Rescue services (FRS) couldn’t access information about the building’s layout fast enough.
Now, new legal obligations on the APs include reporting safety occurrences (to the new Building Safety regulator and the property’s PAP), running a resident engagement strategy, keeping the ‘golden thread’ of building information up to date, and sharing information with relevant third parties.
A secure information box must now be included at the entrance, where Fire & Rescue personnel can find key information they need to know.
The PAP must ensure residents are provided with important safety information when they first move in, and annually thereafter. This includes informing them that fire safety devices and infrastructure (including fire doors and their hardware) must not be tampered with, how to report building safety concerns, and emergency evacuation information, or EEIS (Emergency Evacuation Information Sharing).
One of the recommendations in the Grenfell Tower Inquiry was to create a legal right for any resident who “might find it difficult to self-evacuate” to be provided with a Personal Emergency Evacuation Plan. The variety of disabilities, personal circumstances, the building’s emergency procedures, and staffing complexities have so far prevented a clear, enforceable national policy of assisted evacuation that would be “reasonable and proportionate”.
The Government proposed a Residential PEEPs (Personal emergency evacuation plan) requirement for higher-risk buildings which is expected to become mandatory, but this stops at the creation and sharing of a personalised risk assessment. In the latest proposals (Dec 2024), RPs would make all reasonable efforts to identify vulnerable residents and offer them a Person Centred Fire Risk Assessment (PCFRA). This should identify fire risks to the person, including within their own flat and the common areas, and potential measures to mitigate these. The resulting information is shared with the FRS electronically and via the secure information box, which is likely to help when an evacuation is called for.
All residential buildings over 11m in height require periodic inspections of fire doors and self-closing devices to ensure they have not been compromised and function as necessary.
Clear, open communication between the PAP and APs, contractors, residents, and government agencies is vital for safety.
A concern raised in the Hackett report was one of lack of competence throughout the built environment sector.
As noted in the foreword to the Home Office’s ‘Fire Safety in purpose-built block of flats’:-
“Enforcing authorities are often unfamiliar with the particular issues that can be found in existing blocks of flats. In addition many of those now giving advice to landlords and managing agents also have limited experience of these issues. Of particular concern is the resulting variation in the findings of fire risk assessments carried out by third parties on behalf of landlords and others responsible for fire safety in blocks of flats.”
It is widely accepted that competence is built through a combination of experience and formal training, and professionals are expected to engage with CPD (continued professional development) throughout their career to stay up to date and relevant. Product specific training, such as door closers, can be provided by manufacturers, training providers and trade associations.
The British Standards Institute (BSI) are currently working on new standards for the Built environment, such as BS 8674 - Framework for competence of individual fire risk assessors.
The ISSG (Industrial Safety Steering Group), set up following the Grenfell fire to promote and monitor culture change had to report in 2024 that there are still companies who showing a “tendency to further delay taking action on the basis that some are awaiting further detail to emerge in legislation”. This 4th annual report, in citing the need for closing the training and skills gap, went on “It is for industry itself to define the competencies it needs to deliver work that is fit for purpose, not for this to be prescribed by the regulator.”
Taking on the need for increased competency and trust across the industry, the Building Safety Act mandated the BSR to establish an Industry Competence Committee (ICC) to advise and guide them. The ICC in turn has set up several working committees (under the Industry Competence Steering Group) to bring together specialists from across the built environment industry.
Culture does take time to form, but the signs of quickening change are positive.
Main image credit: Loz Pycock, London, UK (cropped). licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.0 Generic license.
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